on the battlefield. The French Army demonstrated operational finesse in the successful counterattack at Soissons on July 18 and 26, 1918. French forces, supported by 571 tanks and masses of aircraft, drove a deep wedge into the German drive on Paris.
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French infantry and tanks also took part in the attack at Amiens on August 8, 1918: the Allied Offensive that decisively broke the German Front. During the last two months of World War II, the American offensive at St. Mihiel and the Meuse Argonne relied upon the French for tank, air and artillery support.
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Twenty-two years later, the French had lost the technological edge they had enjoyed in 1918. The French ground forces were well-equipped, but their commanders' inability to effectively use the weapons was apparent. In the field of aviation, the technological disparity was significant, with the Germans fielding a force which was both qualitatively and quantitatively superior. In numerous aspects of technology, the German military had shown itself far more innovative and effective in the development and employment of equipment. My purpose in this paper is to explore the background of two contrasting military cultures, the French and the German, and compare their approaches to the development and adaptation of technology. I will first outline the state of comparative technological development of the French and German armies and their forces in [1939] [1940] , and investigate some of those factors that brought those forces to their relative positions. The specific lines of investigation will follow: first will be the influence of doctrine upon technology; second, the influence of military organizational systems upon technology; finally, the influence of the general staff cultures upon technical development.
The State of French and German Military Technology in 1940.
In the 1920s, the French had a clear lead in motorization and tank development. The French motor industry was one of the larger motor industries, and was highly innovative.
For example, in the 1920s, Citroen produced the world's first practical half-track vehicles.
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The military, following the success of French motor production and employment in the World War, had numerous commissions devoted to studying and implementing motorization.
14 In tank development, the French capitalized upon their advantage gained in World War I, and several commissions were given a mandate to develop tanks. French tank design in the 1920s was clearly at the cutting edge, with the design for the Char B heavy tank. The Char B would eventually be deployed in the 1930s, carrying a 75mm and a 47mm gun.
15
In the air, the French also enjoyed a significant technological advantage. In the 1920s, the French air force was the largest in the world.
16
The French air motor industry led the world, and in the mid-1920s, the French held many world records in aviation. The National Aeronautical Institute, founded in 1909, was nationalized and put under the direction of the Air Ministry in 1928. The Institute continued to produce highly qualified aeronautical engineers.
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Both in ground forces motorization and in aviation technology, the French lost their edge in the late 1920s-early 1930s. In Germany, the auto industry--which had been far smaller than the French auto industry of the 1920s--forged ahead. By the early 1930s, with subsidies and incentives from the new Nazi regime, the German auto pp. 335-336. 
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The French were, however, able to keep a high standard in developing tank technology. For example, the French tanks of the mid-1930s were fitted with the world's first cast turrets, and the French tanks of the 1930s had the most sophisticated steering systems of the era.
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The Germans, however, were able to match the level of French tank technology. For example, in 1936 the Panzer II and III were designed with the world's first torsion-bar suspension system.
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In artillery, both countries demonstrated a rough parity in gun quality by 1940. In the post-World War I era, both the French and the German armies had developed medium and heavy guns which were efficient and effective upon the battlefield in 1940.
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In other aspects of motorization, the French fell behind. Having once led the world in half-track production, the French virtually ended development of the half-track in 1933. Starting behind the French, the Germans licensed their technology and then forged ahead with their own, innovative designs. By 1940, a wide variety of halftrack vehicles was assigned to their armored and motorized divisions.
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The Germans took the lead in other areas, as well, including armored cars, armored command vehicles, and tracked assault guns, while French development in these areas remained relatively static. The greatest disparity in ground forces equipment between the French and the Germans was in communications equipment. The French developed relatively few radio systems in the interwar period, and devoted very little money to developing communications equipment.
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Yet, a high priority was assigned to the development of communications equipment which would be set in fixed installations along the Maginot Line.
24
The Germans, on the other hand, placed a very high priority upon developing communications equipment, and produced a wide variety of effective radios for ground forces, infantry, artillery, aviation and tanks.
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As of 1940, only French heavy tanks had radios, whereas all German tanks had radios, and numerous other armored cars and vehicles, as well. With the exception of communications, however, the French Army was not badly equipped in 1940. In fact, they possessed good guns, good tanks for the era, and several armored and motorized divisions. The French Army of 1940 can be said to have had a modern level of motorization. In their approach to motorization, the German and French armies were actually very similar. Both armies were supportive of motorization, and studied it intensively. Both were influenced by national strategic considerations, for both countries were net importers of oil, and were concerned about assuring a supply of oil in case of war. No. 4 (1979) , pp. 5-28. For a good overview of the strategic effect of the oil supply on German concern for oil, as well as the high cost of motorization, ensured that both armies would motorize gradually, and would still use primarily horse-drawn transport for their infantry divisions in 1940. One interesting aspect of the French and German concern about oil imports was that Germany and France were the only nations in the interwar period to develop diesel aircraft engines. Neither the French nor German diesel aircraft engines were effective, though they did have the virtue of using considerably less fuel than the high-performance engines of the era.
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Both armies, employing common sense, chose the artillery branches as the first priority for army mobilization. The overall effect was a practical approach to motorization by France and Germany. While the disparity of technology between ground forces in 1940 was serious, in the air this disparity was, for the French, catastrophic. As to aircraft types, in 1940 the majority of the French aircraft in service were far inferior to their German counterparts. For example, the Bloch 152, the Morane Saulnier 406, and the Curtis Hawk P 36 fighter aircraft were all inferior to the German Me 109 in 1940, and the French bomber force, the Amiot and Farman Bombers, did not come close in performance to the German bombers. 
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The Dewoitane 520 Fighter, which entered production in 1940, was the only aircraft that could hope to match the Me 109.
30
The French Portez 633 heavy fighter was inferior in speed and reliability to the Me 110 of the Germans.
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In the field of dive bombers, the French belatedly manufactured and bought a mere handful of dive bombers by 1940, in contrast to the large German dive bomber program, which enabled the Luftwaffe to employ over 300 Ju 87s for the campaign in France.
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As an overall assessment, the French Air Force in 1940 was approximately 3 years behind the Germans in aircraft development and deployment. The Loire 45 only entered serial production in 1940, whereas the German Heinkel 111s and Dornier 17s had entered serial production in 1937. The only aspect of aviation where a rough equality existed was in aircraft engine development. The French had always had a strong engine industry, and in 1940, had some effective 2,000-horsepower engines in development.
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In other areas, however, the French declined even to compete with the Germans. The most dramatic examples of this were in the development of radar, and of the jet aircraft. At the outbreak of the war, the French navy had developed radar technology, but the French air force had no radar program.
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In contrast, the Germans in 1939 were already producing advanced radar sets, and were deploying radar for air defense.
44
During the interwar period, perceiving that the piston engine had specific speed limitations which were rapidly being approached by the major powers, Heinkel initiated production of both jet engines and jet aircraft. With little government financing and only a handful of engineers, Heinkel developed the first jet engine program in Germany in the mid-1930s.
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The culmination of their efforts came in August 1939, when the Heinkel 178 became the first jet aircraft to fly.
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Finally, in the matter of operational forces, there are other notable disparities between the French and the German interwar forces. In 1935, the Germans--following the lead set by the Soviet Union--began to develop airborne forces. 
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In anti-aircraft technology, France and Germany, which had been approximately equal at the end of World War I, developed a family of light anti-aircraft guns of 20-37mm. In production, however, the French placed little emphasis upon the anti-aircraft arm, and by the outbreak of the war, the French possessed a mere handful of light anti-aircraft guns, relative to the Germans. In the field of heavy antiaircraft guns, the French in 1922 had developed an excellent high-powered 90mm gun, but had then halted further development of heavy anti-aircraft guns and stayed with the low-velocity, obsolete 75mm.
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As for the Germans, by 1932, Krupp and Rheinmetall had developed the famous 88mm antiaircraft gun. By the beginning of World War II, the French Army had only 4,000 anti-aircraft guns of all types versus over 3,000 heavy, and 10,000 light anti-aircraft guns for the German forces. 
Large Units (1921),
52 is described as the battaille conduite, or the methodical battle. In the 1921 Regulations, the French General Staff expressed the view that technology had so changed the battlefield that firepower was now the primary element in warfare.
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Firepower made the defense extremely powerful. The French Army, however, also determined that only the offense could bring victory and a successful conclusion to the campaign. Therefore, a great part of the French doctrinal thought was tied up in the methodical battle, which is in essence an offensive doctrine. The French offensive doctrine of the interwar period had the following characteristics: _ Strict, centralized control by the core and the army, with little room for initiative of junior commanders; _ Since firepower dominated the battle, artillery support would be massive, centralized and concentrated; _ The infantry would move forward by short bounds of 5 kilometers or so, under massive artillery support, and at that point, the advance would halt in accordance with specific phase lines, so that the artillery could deploy forward, and the battle could be rejoined, on successive days.
Under the terms of the methodical battle, commanders such as Gamelin, Petain and Weygand believed that the correct employment of doctrine could ensure victory. The methodical battle had its origins in the campaigns and methodology of 1918. After the disasters of 1916 and 1917, it seemed that the French Army had finally discovered the secret of success on the battlefield, by carefully planned offensives with massive firepower. These forerunners of the methodical battle proved their effectiveness in the Summer and Fall of 1918. In its essence, the tactics of late 1918 were geared to the minimization of casualties of the French Army. Tanks, in fact, played a very large role in the French methodical battle. In the interwar period, studies on the armor force developed the corollary to the French dogma: namely, that infantry would not in fact be able to successfully advance without strong tank support.
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The French Army doctrine was couched in the terminology of science, or more accurately, pseudo-science. Articles and discussions within the Army concerning the methodical battle contained numerous tables and formulae, which were published as appendices to the doctrine.
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For example, various attacks required specific gun frontages per square kilometer before an attack could be initiated.
56
The effectiveness of the Maginot Line defenses, in another case was illustrated by tables demonstrating the number of rounds from German heavy guns that were necessary to knock out each armored casement. In this example the number of rounds was so large, one could conclude that the Maginot Line was effectively unbreakable.
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In yet another case, mathematical formulae were used to prove the effectiveness and superiority of anti-tank guns defending against a German armored attack. anti-tank guns.
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Since rapid movement and maneuver were not part of the French interwar doctrine, however, very little effort was devoted to developing radio communications for the Army. The development of French motor vehicles provides a useful illustration of the superiority of doctrine over technology. The Army used early model half-tracks in experiments of the 1920s, and these greatly impressed the German observers.
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Half-tracks were most suitable for rapid operational maneuver and motorized units, however, which at the time were not emphasized in French doctrine. Thus, deployment of half-tracks was dropped for lack of interest. Armored cars played a relatively minor role in French doctrine as well, because reconnaissance had less importance in the French doctrine. As a result, the high-quality Panhard armored cars of the 1930s were given a low priority, although the quality of the product was technically equal to that of the Germans.
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Yet another case of the primacy of doctrine over technology is the example of antiaircraft guns. Anti-aircraft was the responsibility of the army's Artillery Directorate. The army placed little confidence in airpower as having a decisive effect upon the battlefield. Gamelin himself believed that the losses of aircraft in the first few weeks of the war would be so heavy, that airpower would cease to be an important factor in the battle. 62 In 1938, General Gamelin commented, "The role of aviation is apt to be exaggerated, and after the early days of war the wastage will be such that it will more and more be confined to acting as an accessory to the army", as cited in French lagged behind in the development of antiaircraft guns.
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French Air Force Doctrine and Technical Development. The technological development of the French ground forces was limited by the rigid doctrine of the army; the French air force suffered from the opposite situation: a lack of clear doctrine providing consistent paradigms for the development of technology. In the decade after World War I, French air doctrine developed little from the operations of 1918. Until 1933, the French air force was part of the army, and the army was primarily interested in reconnaissance, observation, close interdiction and air defense. The use of airpower was not a priority in the army doctrine of 1921; indeed, aviation was scarcely mentioned in the army regulations. In the 1930s the Commanders in Chief, Generals Weygand and Gamelin, demonstrated little knowledge or informed interest in military aviation. The French air force was largely left to its own devices in developing doctrine, but even after it became an independent service, the air force generals lacked the status both within the military and within the French political system to further specific doctrines or approaches to technology. The army commander, as the military's supreme commander, had the status to establish doctrinal and strategic guidelines for all the services, but showed a lack of interest in aviation doctrine. This meant that the French air doctrine of the 1920s and 1930s became, by default, the responsibility of civilian air ministers, and with changes in air ministers, doctrine changed dramatically. Though the French air arm had mainly an army support function in the late 1920s, the strategic bombing theories of the Italian General, Douhet, gained a wide acceptance among the air force officer corps. In the late 1920s, a program to produce a "battle plane" in accordance with Douhet's doctrine was initiated. Known as the "BCR" (Battle, Combat, Reconnaissance) aircraft, this multiseater, two-engine craft would carry out army support functions and also be able to reinforce the heavy bomber force in carrying out long-range, strategic operations. This attempt to apply Douhet's doctrine to technology resulted in a series of thoroughly inferior multi-purpose aircraft, which proved to be mediocre in each mission. In January 1936, Pierre Cot became French Aviation Minister, and inaugurated a series of major rearmament programs for the Air Force. Due to the poor performance of the aviation industry in developing and manufacturing aircraft, Cot initiated a program to nationalize and rationalize French aviation production. By infusing the aviation industry with large amounts of new capital, he hoped to create the large air force France needed. From 1936 to 1938, under Cot's Ministry, the primary focus of the French Air Force was in building a strategic bomber force. Cot firmly believed in the offensive mission of the air force, and was an enthusiast for Douhetian doctrine.
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In 1938, however, when the government changed and Cot was removed, the new Air Minister, Guy LeChambre, began a new armaments plan for the Air Force, known as "Plan 5". Plan 5 rejected the emphasis on bomber production, and instead placed the production and development emphasis upon fighter planes. to form a defensive line to protect army operations.
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Bombing became a secondary mission. Thus, by the outbreak of the war, the French had in one decade undergone three major changes in operational doctrine, all instituted by the Air Ministry. The nationalization program by the war's outbreak had produced results in increased aircraft production. Nevertheless, French aircraft production continued to lag behind that of the Germans.
The German policy tended toward the standardization of a few kinds of aircraft for specific missions. For example, the Germans built only one, single-engine fighter in quantity before World War II: the Me 109. The French, however, distributed aircraft production among the various aircraft companies, and ordered small quantities of many different aircraft models. The French were unable to achieve anything resembling economies of scale in the 1930s, so that by the war's outbreak, the French were flying a half dozen different single-engine fighters to Germany's one. The same situation existed for bombers and reconnaissance aircraft. 
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Von Seeckt, who coordinated the post-war study of doctrine, took an entirely different position from the French military. Von Seeckt believed that maneuver, not firepower, was the dominant element in warfare, and that to execute maneuver, mobility was essential. Unlike the French, the Germans believed much more strongly in the offense. The Germans sought the means to get the armies out of the trenches and static battles, which were seen as ultimately to Germany's strategic disadvantage, and to win campaigns and decisions quickly, by maneuver and mobility. In contrast to the French, who affirmed the essential unity of the army, 70 von Seeckt and the Reichswehr maintained a doctrine of warfare which essentially relied upon the establishment of two, different armies. One army would be an elite force, heavily armed with the latest weaponry and highly mobile. This army would be the offensive force, which would seek the decisive battle and out-maneuver its opponents. The second army would be primarily infantry, would not be as well-armed, and would primarily consist of reservists. This second army would act mainly in a defensive capacity.
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Again in contrast to the French, Army Regulation 487 emphasized in its preface that war was an art--albeit, a rational art--and not a science. There was little of the pseudo-scientific emphasis upon tables and formulae to be found in the French operational regulations of 1921 and 1936. Army Regulation 487 outlined a number of general principles to be followed, but no formulae. For example, the German operational doctrine de-centralized the operational leadership, and not only allowed, but insisted that junior officers would possess considerable initiative in command. Artillery, which in France was highly centralized, was decentralized in the German Army. The emphasis was not upon deploying large numbers of guns, as with the French Army, but rather upon rapidly deploying smaller numbers of guns. Army Regulation 487 emphasized combined arms operations, and airpower played an important part in the German Army operational regulations. In addition, due to the emphasis upon offensive maneuver, tanks were given an important role in German doctrine of the 1920s.
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This operational doctrine led the German Army in a number of technological directions. For instance, the mobile battlefield required mobile communications. Accordingly, the Germans set about in the 1920s to develop an entire family of army and air force radios for rapid communication. German doctrine also implicitly emphasized coordination of the air and ground forces at the operational level, as well as the use of tanks and armored vehicles. Finally, the doctrine of maneuver warfare pushed the German Army toward an intensive study of motorization. By 1926, the first table of organization and equipment for a motorized division, and tables of organization and equipment for mechanized brigades, had been set out in detail by the General Staff. In the 1920s, within the German Army, a secret air staff was set up to perform the functions of an air force general staff, in the expectation of eventual rearmament, and the creation of an independent air force.
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The conclusion of the Air Staff from their study of World War I was that airpower was intrinsically most effective in the offense, not the defense. Even though German airmen had fought a defensive air war during World War I, and had enjoyed an extremely high kill ratio versus the Allies, they discovered that a strong aerial defense did not lend itself to decision in war.
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Therefore, the Germans concluded that bombers were the primary weapon of the air arm. In an air campaign, the first priority of the air force would be to gain air superiority. The air superiority battle would be won by taking the war to the enemy and destroying his air force, preferably on the ground, in his airfields. Once air superiority had been gained, the air force would move to the interdiction and strategic bombing missions.
Like the army, the air force doctrine essentially outlined the creation of two air forces: one air force would be an army support force, flying short-range reconnaissance missions, observation missions, providing fighter defense for the army, and carrying out ground attacks. The second air force would be an independent air force serving under the strategic but not operational direction of the High Command. The independent air force had a strategic mission. The operational air force's strategic mission was not solely to bomb cities or industries deep in the enemy heartland--although this was a possible mission. The German concept of strategic air war was based upon strategic effect. The independent air force, essentially a bomber force and a long-range force, would be directed toward those targets that would produce the most decisive effect. This could sometimes entail bombing the enemy armaments industry, but in other cases, it could entail direct bombing the enemy army or his transportation.
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German air doctrine of the 1920s applied some of the Prussian Army's most traditional principles to the new 74 Richtlinien für die Führung des Operativen Luftkrieges, May 1926. 75 Ibid., paragraphs 1-7. Ibid., para. 40: "A delaying action in the air or a purely defensive approach does not describe the true character of the air force." 76 Ibid., paras. 83-85 and 91-95. aerial weapon. First of all, airpower would be used in mass, and not distributed in small packets. Second, the strategic air force would maintain a large operational reserve, ready to exploit opportunities. Third, airpower would be used at the decisive point. In 1935, the reestablished Luftwaffe published a new operational regulation, Luftwaffe Regulation 16: Conduct of the Air War. The essential principles of air war that had been developed in the 1926 were outlined in greater detail. However, the basic lines of doctrinal evolution remained unchanged. This doctrinal stability was of great benefit in developing weapons and equipment. The Luftwaffe that went to war in 1939-1940 was the bomber-heavy force that was called for by the doctrine of the interwar years.
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The dive bomber, under study and development since the mid1920s, was available for the CAS mission and also to hit strategic targets. The German doctrine called for fighter escort of the bombers so the Me 110 long-range fighter was developed for this purpose. Army/Air Force cooperation was an important part of doctrine so a considerable organization equipped with mobile communications systems was created.
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Consistently, the deficiencies in the German doctrine also resulted in deficiencies in equipment development and procurement. The best illustration of this principle in the Luftwaffe is found in the lack of interest in doctrine for naval aviation before World War II. At the outbreak of the war modern combat aircraft designed for long range antishipping strikes and torpedo attacks were not available. The naval air arm had to make do with relatively obsolete, low performance seaplanes.It was a deficiency that would hurt the Germans considerably when they went to war against Britain. 
The Influence of Organization upon Technical Development.
The French Army and Air Force were poorly organized to develop and oversee the production of modern equipment. From the end of World War I until the early 1930s the French Army possessed no centralized office specifically charged with the responsibility for developing and evaluating new technology. In the post war era, each of the major branches of the army (infantry, cavalry, engineers, artillery etc.) had its own technical office and was responsible for developing the equipment that pertained to that branch. The infantry branch, for example, had responsibility for tank development as tanks were considered to be an auxiliary of the infantry. Development of other armored vehicles such as armored cars were, however, the responsibility of the cavalry branch. No section of the General Staff carried the authority to coordinate branch weapons programs or to ensure an objective program of testing.
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While each branch technical office contained some officers who were qualified and even highly talented in technical matters there existed no comprehensive or systematic program of cooperation between the branches. Development in the French Army was carried out in a fragmented, compartmentalized manner. In the early 1930s under the initiative of General Weygand, then Vice-President of the Conseil Superieur de Guerre, some attempt was made to bring order to the process. A Consultative Council on Armament was created consisting of the senior branch inspectors, General Staff department heads and the Chief of the General Staff. A Technical Cabinet was created to act as a central office for research, testing and manufacture. Yet, the reform had only a partial effect. The actual development of weapons and the establishment of the specifications for the equipment still resided within the branches of the army. In 1933, the energetic and capable war minister Eduard Daladier created a new department for the manufacture of armaments which would execute the armaments plans formulated by the branches, but supervision over the departments themselves was still lacking.
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Finally, in 1935, the Technical Cabinet was replaced by a new section for armaments as a permanent office of the General Staff. However, this new section carried relatively little formal authority to coordinate the development and procurement process. The French Air Force's development of equipment suffered from organizational problems within the French aviation industry and especially within the Aviation Ministry. The first problem of the air force was one of command authority. In wartime, the air force was subordinate to the army. In peacetime, however, the air force operated under the Ministry of Aviation. In 1928, when the Aviation Ministry was created, the air force was still a branch of the army and the French aviation industry was in a state of decline. In the 1920s the aviation industry lived primarily from small orders from the military. Although in the 1920s into the 1930s the French commercial air lines received the highest subsidies in Europe, 82 the French aviation industry made little progress in developing modern and competitive transport planes or an infrastructure of modern airfields. 
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The Air Ministry, a bloated and poorly-organized agency (When it was established in 1928 there were over 1,000 ministry employees in the Paris headquarters alone) had notoriously poor relationships with manufacturers and commercial organizations. While the Air Ministry performed poorly in its duty to further development of aviation technology, the French Air Force leadership deserves much of the blame for France's position in 1940. While the Air Force carefully followed the development of aircraft there was little planning in the Air Staff for the materiél and personnel requirements of maintaining the aircraft and equipment required for a modern air force. At the outbreak of the war, the French Air Force had only 40% of their required radiomen and 23% of the required mechanics. A special commission was set up by the air force to determine personnel needs on 26 September, 1939--almost a month after the outbreak of war.
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Other examples of poor industrial planning by the staffs abound. At the outbreak of the war, French production plummeted due to the call-up of skilled aircraft factory technicians to serve as reserve infantrymen at the front. Later in 1939, many soldiers were released from duty in the army to return to war production.
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Numerous similar occurrences happened in the for the manufacture of armaments for the army. Renault's largest tank plant was almost closed in September, 1939 due to the call-up of skilled workers.
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With decades to plan for a major war, neither the French Air Force or the French Army had developed a staff or adequate plans for coordinating the economic side of warfare. 
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Even today, no one is sure of how many aircraft were grounded for lack of bombsights, radios, machine guns or other basic equipment--but even the official histories imply that the numbers were in the hundreds.
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The Germans began the campaign in 1940 with significant aerial superiority.
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The lack of coordination and planning by the French Air Force ensured the Germans a decisive margin of superiority. 91 In the mid-1920s, the Waffenamt employed 64 officers, including 2 major generals, two colonels and 12 lieutenant weapons development which corresponded to the Truppenamt's inspectorates. It was the duty of the General Staff inspectorates to develop ideas, doctrine and training programs for new equipment as well as requests for research and specifications for new weapons. The inspectorate worked together with its corresponding Waffenamt inspectorate which would develop prototypes and conduct testing. The responsibility for the development of weapons and equipment lay directly in the hands of the Chief of the Waffenamt who reported directly to the Army Commander in Chief and the Defense Minister.
German Organization and
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Unlike the compartmentalization of the French system, the development of technology was seen as a coordinated whole and several inspectorates would cooperate on the development of some items of equipment. For example, the chief responsibility for the development of tanks lay with the motor vehicle section of the Waffenamt which worked together with the Inspectorate of Motor Vehicles in the Truppenamt. However, representatives from the Inspectorate of Communications Troops were also assigned to the armor projects in order to ensure radios were developed for the tanks. The artillery inspectorates were assigned the responsibility for developing tank guns and also had members assigned to tank development projects. Realizing the importance for production planning in modern warfare, a war economics office was created in 1926 and reported to the Army Commander. the assignment of the war economics office was to maintain contact with armaments industries, collect information and carry out planning for industrial mobilization.
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This system, which the Nazis inherited in 1933, worked fairly rationally to create prototypes of equipment which matched doctrinal requirements with considerably less duplication of effort than the programs of the French General Staff. The French, for example, had two sets of tank programs in the 1930s--one in the Infantry inspectorate and the other in the Cavalry Inspectorate. The economics planning office was never able to effectively meet the enormous task given to it. However, again in contrast to colonels. An additional 21 officers worked at test sites for the Waffenamt. See Wehrministerium, Rangliste des Deutschen Reichsheeres, Berlin (1925) . the French, by the outbreak of the war at least a rudimentary personnel plans had been set which exempted skilled civilian workers in the armaments industries from military service. The Germans in the early months of the war experienced only minor reductions in some areas of production due to the call-up of reservists.
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For the development of military aviation technology, the Germans had to rely upon a more awkward organizational system due to the ban on military aviation required by the Versailles Treaty. The shadow air staff had representatives spread throughout the General Staff. For example, the Intelligence Section contained one or two airmen who specialized in air intelligence. Sections for aviation were distributed within the Weapons Office. Also involved in development of aviation technology was the aviation department of the Ministry of Transportation. The Aviation Department was responsible for regulating all aspects of German civil aviation. Despite this awkward system, which did not provide for any single agency for development of aviation, the Germans managed to forge ahead in development and, by 1927, develop aircraft technology superior to France's.
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The cause for the successful rebirth of German aviation in the 1920s was the extraordinary level of cooperation between the armed forces, the Aviation Department of the Transportation Ministry and the civilian manufacturers. The German Undersecretary for Aviation from 1923-1934 was Captain Ernst Brandenburg, wartime commander of the 1st Bomber Wing which had carried out the strategic campaign against London with Gotha bombers in 1917-18. Brandenburg, who was appointed at the insistence of the Army Commander von Seeckt, worked to develop German civil aviation as a basis for later aerial rearmament. 
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Manufacturers such as Ernst Heinkel worked closely with the air staff to develop new aircraft at a time when the InterAllied Control Commission had shut down German aviation.
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In 1926, senior Lufthansa manager (and wartime air officer) Dr. Robert Knauss made a pioneering long-distance flight from Berlin to Peking. Upon his return to Berlin, he delivered his flight logs to Lt.Col. Wilberg, chief army staff officer for aviation.
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With a smaller budget than the French, the civil aviation department used its money wisely to develop the necessary basic infrastructure for modern aviation.
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The level of research on aviation carried out in German institutes of the 1920s and early 30s was equivalent to the level of French research. By the late 1920s, the Germans had planned for a limited rearmament and the secret air staff accelerated work in developing prototypes for a reborn German air force. With a realization that the air staff system of the Reichswehr General Staff was diluted among too many offices, General Blomberg in 1932 prepared and won approval for a plan to consolidate all the Reichswehr air activities into one department which would be called the "Air Defense Office". 
Military Culture and Technology.
The tradition and culture of the German General Staff enabled it to adapt at a rapid pace of technical development and experimentation in the interwar period. The tradition of the General Staff, which was maintained and strengthened under the tenure of Hans von Seeckt, emphasized a logical and critical approach to questions of operational doctrine, military organization and equipment. The General Staff Corps had great prestige within the army and the officers selected for the General Staff were allowed a considerable degree of freedom to question, criticize and propose new ideas. While the senior commanders of the army were expected to have strategic and operational vision, even the junior officers of the General Staff were allowed and encouraged to make modifications and contributions to the ideas proposed by their seniors. In short, the General Staff Corps saw itself as a collective body which had the responsibility to develop ideas. One of the most characteristic expressions of the German military culture was the Denkschrift, literally "Thought Paper". Officers would propose ideas or critique ideas in essays circulated throughout the General Staff. The tradition of the General Staff was such that these essays were read by the senior commanders, and often acted upon. At the very least, the Denkschrift would provide a framework for debate. In the immediate aftermath of World War I, two important Denkschriften concerning war and technology were circulated among the High Command. The first was von Seeckt's proposal for a small, elite and highly mobile professional army. Maneuver warfare, von Seeckt argued, required a professional force because only a highly-trained elite force could hope to effectively use the complex modern weapons and move with rapidity to gain the decision. 
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By 1937, development and testing of the assault guns was underway, and trials proved their feasibility. By the outbreak of the war, production of the assault guns was underway, and a detachment of the first models, with a 75mm gun mounted on the chassis of a Panzer III tank, proved their worth in battle. Officers with a specialized technical background in civil aviation were enlisted into the technical and special staffs of the new Luftwaffe, and many rose to high rank. Several historians, including Richard Overy, have suggested that the Luftwaffe suffered from serious leadership problems, since such a large proportion of the Luftwaffe officers were brought in from civil aviation.
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Other writers, noting the several hundred officers transferred from the army in 1934-35--Wever, Kesselring, and Stumpf, to name a few--refer to the senior leadership of the Luftwaffe as "amateur aviators."
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Overy argues that there was a clash between the "Prussians", the regular officers who had remained with the Reichswehr, and the "Outsiders", who had service records of all 688 men who reached the rank of General in the Luftwaffe. 113 Ibid. 114 Ibid. 115 Ibid. 116 Ibid. 117 Overy asserts that the inclusion of so many reactivated officers and officers from the army "had the unfortunate consequence of dividing the air officer corps into those who regarded themselves as heirs of the Prussian tradition, and those who came from an unorthodox, particularly technical background. Part of the hostility felt between regular soldiers and the parvenues arose from the fact that the newcomers were given high military office without having followed the normal army channels." See R. 
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Of course, there were serious personality clashes between senior officers of the Luftwaffe--as with any military service--but there is no evidence of animosity on the basis of "Prussian" or "Outsider" status. That Milch was disliked by many was more a function of his own personality than his service with Lufthansa. Even those who disliked him regarded him as highly competent.
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Wever came from the army, but was nevertheless highly respected by the professional airmen of the Reichswehr. I would argue that the influx of hundreds of reserve officers from civil aviation in the first stages of the German aerial rearmament was one of the great advantages that the Germans enjoyed in the interwar period. The officers from Lufthansa or Junkers were probably better informed about the nature of modern aircraft technology and the conditions of long-distance flying than regular French officers, who had led an air force garrison life of staff and flying jobs during this same period. The Luftwaffe's superior use of human resources is one factor which enabled the Germans to gain the technical advantage over the French in 1940. The director of airfield construction for the Luftwaffe was brought in from civilian life as an airfield construction engineer and professor of architecture at a civilian university.
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No professional military airmen knew more about the management side of aviation, nor had they achieved the same degree of success, as Erhard Milch. As to the amateur status of officers brought from the Army--many, like Kesselring, learned to fly and later proved themselves to be excellent operational air commanders.
The French Military Culture. The French General Staff tradition was significantly different from that of the Germans. In the French tradition, the staff was no more than an organization to assist the commander. The direction, ideas and vision all flowed from the commander. Open debate of operational concepts was not part of the French military culture. In contrast to the comprehensive and critical effort of the 500 officers who worked to develop German operational doctrine after World War I, the French operational regulation was drawn up by a committee of 13 officers.
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When Charles DeGaulle initiated a debate about the organization of a large armored force in 1934, he was punished by having his promotion to colonel delayed. Professor Jenny Kiesling has argued that the French interwar army discouraged debate because, in an army dependent upon large numbers of reserve officers, bringing the doctrine of the army into question would indicate a lack of confidence and thus undermine morale.
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Other factors may also have ensured a less critical approach by the French officer corps. If the French Army had initiated a comprehensive examination of the lessons of World War I, they would have had to discuss, and attempt to come to grips with, the scandalous mass mutinies of 1917, when half the divisions of the army were incapacitated by their refusal to attack. Although these mutinies were quelled by hundreds of secret executions, the French Army has, to this day, refused to examine those events. The French also suffered from the lack of vision displayed by its commanders regarding motorization. To be sure, from the 1930s on,Gamelin placed a high priority upon the creation of motorized divisions, but his concept of motorization was essentially flawed. Gamelin was interested in motorization as a purely strategic concept: the creation of a motorized reserve force which could move quickly to Belgium in order to deploy against the Germans. Gamelin, moreover, had no concept of operational mobility: motorization helped infantry divisions move quickly by truck; once they arrived, they would dismount and fight like any other line infantry division.
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Due to this lack of an operational concept, the French did not develop communications, armored carriers, self-propelled guns, etc. like the Germans--though the French did have the required expertise, and the industrial base. The culture of the French Air Force command played a central role in that force's poor position in 1940. During the interwar period, the French Air Force had the aspect of a pilots' club. Commanders were interested in developing aircraft types, but little thought was given to creating the infrastructure of an operational force, or in planning for industrial mobilization. Like the Germans, the French possessed a large reserve of experienced airmen from the First World War who had entered civil aviation. As rearmament accelerated in the 1930s, however, the only interest that the regular air force officers had in their reserve officers was in their flying proficiency. 
CONCLUSION
Many elements contribute to the technology of an armed force. The economic base of a nation, its educational system, its financial position, all are decisive factors and their importance should not be underrated. A comprehensive approach to the study of interwar technology would require a hefty volume. I have therefore confined myself to a few factors concerning the effect of military doctrine, organization and culture upon technology. My conclusion is that these factors have as much bearing upon the development, procurement and employment of weapons as the objective economic and scientific factors. Further, the comparison of the French and Germans in this period illustrates the importance of the individual military commanders upon the development of technology. One can plausibly assign some of the blame for the poor state of the French Army and Air Force in 1940 to the politicians and to the economy, but this does not absolve the commanders from failing in their duty to oversee the development of an effective doctrine, and effective weapons to match that doctrine. Despite the complaints of the official French histories concerning the lack of funding for the military in the interwar period, this was not the major cause for technological deficiency.
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In those areas where the French provided higher funding than the Germans--notably, civil aviation--they still went to war with inferior technology. It is certainly not my intention to claim that the German approach was foolproof, or even particularly efficient. The Germans built their share of bad weapons and aircraft. As Richard Overy points out in War and Economy in the Third Reich, the war economy of 1939-1940 was extremely inefficient.
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Volumes have already been written on the technological mistakes the Germans made before and during 
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The purpose of this paper is to compare the two approaches to technology, and the German approach still comes across by far as the most successful. It was primarily successful due to a military culture that encouraged innovation, discussion, debate and a comprehensive approach to the study of war.
